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Notes
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CRIMINAL LAW, AND
THE TRIAL OF DEREK CHAUVIN
SEAN A. BERMAN†
ABSTRACT
This Note describes how criminal trials for prominent criminal acts
contribute to the collective memory of the underlying offense. Hannah
Arendt once argued that the purpose of criminal trials is to “render
justice, and nothing else.” Unlike criminal trials, political trials strive to
produce collective memory. This Note utilizes political trials as a foil to
criminal trials to identify the ways that criminal trials succeed (and fail)
to produce collective memory. Several features of the criminal trial—
namely, the trial’s unique narrative form, constituent storytellers,
capacity to capture the gravity of the offense, and jury—add to society’s
shared narrative of the offense. By developing and utilizing a
framework for how criminal trials manufacture collective memory, this
Note considers how the trial of Derek Chauvin adds to the collective
memory of George Floyd’s murder.

INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1961 trial of SS Officer Adolf Eichmann,1 the genocide
perpetrated by the Nazis was suppressed in American life—seen as just
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1. Adolf Eichmann organized the Final Solution during World War II. See Adolf Eichmann,
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/adolfeichmann [https://perma.cc/8WZJ-EHXY], (last updated Aug. 30, 2018) (describing Eichmann as
“in charge of transporting Jews from all over Europe to the killing centers”). Following his escape
from a U.S. prisoner of war camp in 1946, Israeli intelligence captured Eichmann in Argentina.
Id. After a widely publicized trial, Eichmann was sentenced to death in 1961. Id.
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one piece of “a holocaust” in Europe known as World War II.2 By the
time Eichmann was found guilty and executed in Jerusalem, “the
Holocaust” had become a distinct event, collectively remembered as
the West’s most notorious crime against humanity.3 Only after
survivors testified and Eichmann’s crimes were displayed on an
international stage was the history of the Holocaust revived in
American collective memory.4 But the capacity of the Eichmann trial
to effectuate this societal shift is largely a function of the trial’s
purposeful mission to craft a story about the Jewish people’s suffering
at the hands of the Nazis and subsequent resurrection as a nationstate.5 Using the Eichmann trial and other political trials as foils,6 this
Note explains the power and limits of the U.S. criminal trial to
contribute to the collective memory of prominent criminal acts.
Collective memory is a community’s shared narrative of the past.7
It is, in part, crafted by individual group members and, in part, forged
through influences beyond individual members’ control.8 It depends on
individual remembrance yet is “stubbornly impervious” to any one
member’s desire to escape it.9 Open to forgetting, deformation,

2. See Devin O. Pendas, The Eichmann Trial in Law and Memory, in POLITICAL TRIALS IN
THEORY AND HISTORY 205, 220 (Jens Meierhenrich & Devin O. Pendas eds., 2016) (“[B]y the
time of the Eichmann trial in 1961, the Holocaust had been marginalized in the global discussion
of World War II.”).
3. See PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 133–34 (1999) (observing a
society-wide shift from the use of “the Nazi holocaust” to “the Holocaust”).
4. Id. at 103, 134 (stating that “[b]etween the end of the war and the 1960s, . . . the
Holocaust made scarcely any appearance in American public discourse,” but that “the Eichmann
trial was the first time that the American public was presented with the Holocaust as a
distinct . . . entity”).
5. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 62 (1997)
(noting how Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion “sought to frame the courtroom
narrative . . . as a tale about the Jewish community’s collective victimization, suffering, resistance,
resurrection . . . and, finally, redemption as a powerful nation-state”).
6. For the purposes of this Note, political trials sacrifice some of the defendant’s rights and
try the defendant for crimes with many victims in jurisdictions either geographically or temporally
beyond the reach of the regime holding the trial. See infra Part II.A.
7. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 18 n.28 (“Collective memory consists of past reminiscences
that link given groups of people for whom the remembered events are important, that is, the
events remain significant to them later on.”); JOHN BODNAR, REMAKING AMERICA: PUBLIC
MEMORY, COMMEMORATION, AND PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (1992)
(“Public memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society
understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future.”).
8. See Jeffrey K. Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 17 SOCIO. THEORY 333, 342
(1999) (noting the two-way relationship of individuals and collective memory).
9. Id.
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manipulation, appropriation, dormancy, and revival,10 collective
memory is the living past—giving consequence in the present to what
has come before.11
Collective memory matters because of its ability to affect our
present-day society, politics, and law.12 Consider the longstanding
narrative of the “Lost Cause,” which perpetuates—even today—a
glorified myth of southern righteousness for the Civil War.13 Or take
how President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal colors reactions to
allegations of political corruption, in both namesake and substance.14
Or look to how the Supreme Court so commonly reminds the legal
world of its aversion to the days of Lochner, when freedom of contract
plagued the Court with unacceptable levels of indeterminacy.15
This Note focuses on the relationship between collective memory
and the law, specifically analyzing how the criminal trial influences
collective memory of the underlying offense. Political philosopher
Hannah Arendt argued—in reaction to observing the Eichmann trial—
that the “main business” of criminal law is to “weigh the charges
10. Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire, 26
REPRESENTATIONS 7, 8 (1989) [hereinafter Nora, Between Memory and History].
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. There is a temptation to determine a distinction
between memory and history. The concepts are distinct and, in some ways, stand in opposition to
one another. See Nora, Between Memory and History, supra note 10, at 9 (“History is perpetually
suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.”). There is no scholarly
consensus on drawing a line between the two. See Eric Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a
Factor in Political Culture and International Relations, in POWER AND THE PAST: COLLECTIVE
MEMORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13, 27 (Eric Langenbacher & Yossi Shain eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a Factor] (“[M]any authors correctly argue that
this distinction [between memory and history] is untenable.”). This Author’s view is that the
symbiotic relationship between history and memory makes focusing on precise line-drawing an
unworthy endeavor.
12. See Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a Factor, supra note 11, at 25 (“Collective
memory helps to constitute a political culture, and thus it is an ideational factor that influences
the thinking of individuals—if culture matters, then memory matters.”).
13. See Michel Paradis, The Lost Cause’s Long Legacy, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/the-lost-causes-long-legacy/613288 [https://perma.cc/
4WZH-X5QN] (“[T]he Lost Cause recast the Confederacy’s humiliating defeat in a treasonous
war for slavery as the embodiment of the Framers’ true vision for America.”).
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY: HOW WE
REMEMBER, FORGET, AND RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 150–51 (1992) (explaining the wide-ranging
use of the “-gate” suffix for subsequent political scandals); Cory Bennett, How Donald Trump
Has Redefined Watergate, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/07/05/trumpnixon-watergate-344769 [https://perma.cc/56PG-BQYE], (last updated July 5, 2020, 1:55 PM)
(noting former President Trump’s frequent use of Watergate when alleging corruption by his
political opponents).
15. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 85
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1523 (2005) (describing the use of “Lochner” as an epithet).
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brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due
punishment.”16 Put another way, Arendt stated that the purpose of a
criminal trial is to “render justice, and nothing else.”17 Arendt’s claim,
while seemingly uncontroversial, fails to capture one of the criminal
trial’s secondary, yet consequential, functions: contributing to the
collective memory of prominent offenses. This Note argues that the
criminal trial does so through its unique narrative form, constituent
storytellers, capacity to capture the gravity of the offense, and jury.
In times of accelerated change, societies grasp at opportunities to
manifest the past into lieux de mémoire18—or sites of memory—to
make better sense of the present.19 The murder of George Floyd
sparked one such moment of accelerated change. Within weeks of
then-Officer Derek Chauvin kneeling on George Floyd as he took his
last breath, millions of people had seen bystander Darnella Frazier’s
video.20 The murder had set off what is widely considered the largest
protest movement in the history of the United States.21 For a crime of
such profound effect, its trial serves as a site of memory.
Collective memory in a pluralistic society is, and should be, a
competition over the meaning of the past. This Note adopts a concept
of collective memory that embraces two concurrent competitions, one
over who defines the past and another over what memories prevail in
the collective. By offering a means of analyzing how the Derek
Chauvin trial contributes to the collective memory of George Floyd’s
murder, this Note grapples with the trial’s ability to compete with other
16. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
253 (Penguin Books 2006) (1963).
17. Id.
18. Pierre Nora coined the term lieu de mémoire, or “site of memory,” to broadly describe
“material, symbolic, and functional” locations and institutions invested with historical meaning.
Nora, Between Memory and History, supra note 10, at 18–19. Sites of memory are not only
physical locations or structures imbued with historical meaning—such as memorials. Id. at 19.
Instead, sites can include far broader conceptions or rituals—such as moments of silence or
community reunions. Id.
19. See Pierre Nora, Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory, EUROZINE (Apr. 19, 2002),
https://www.eurozine.com/reasons-for-the-current-upsurge-in-memory [https://perma.cc/DH2APGK2], reprinted in THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY READER 437, 438 (Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered
Vinitzky-Seroussi & Daniel Levy eds., 2011) (“[T]he present—which, for this very reason no
doubt, now has a battery of technical means at its disposal for preserving the past—puts us under
an obligation to remember.”).
20. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Probable Cause and Performing “for the People,” 70 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 138, 140–41 (2021).
21. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/786W-KNLB].
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sources of memory, most notably mass media, and identifies the trial’s
unique contributions to memory. The power of collective memory
establishes the stakes of this competition and gives this Note purpose.22
Part I explores the concept of collective memory. Building upon
this foundation, Part II analyzes how the criminal trial forges collective
memory by investigating the trial’s prominent features. Part II also
explores the competition between the trial and the media as sources of
memory and identifies how these sources contribute to memory
separately and collaboratively. Part II’s theoretical framework
undergirds Part III’s analysis of how the trial of Derek Chauvin shapes
the collective memory of George Floyd’s murder.
I. COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE LIVING PAST
This Part surveys collective memory to prime Part II’s discussion
on how the criminal trial contributes to collective memory of the
underlying offense.
A. Evolutions in Collective Memory and Pluralistic Memory
Collective memory is a community’s shared narrative of the past.23
In the early twentieth century, sociologist Émile Durkheim laid the
foundations for the earliest conceptions of collective memory.24 Most
critically, Durkheim’s concept of collective conscience—referring to
“[t]he totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of
the same society”25—informed a view of the collective as unitary and
monolithic.26 Stirred by this approach, Durkheim’s own student and

22. See Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a Factor, supra note 11, at 33 (“[B]ecause
memories are part of a society’s culture, their potential influence, power, and competition are
central.”).
23. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 18 n.28 (“Collective memory consists of past reminiscences
that link given groups of people for whom the remembered events are important, that is, the
events remain significant to them later on.”).
24. See Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi & Daniel Levy, Introduction to THE
COLLECTIVE MEMORY READER, supra note 19, at 3, 16 (“[Founder of collective memory
Maurice] Halbwachs’s interest in memory combined insights from two important figures in late
nineteenth-century France, philosopher Henri Bergson and sociologist Émile Durkheim . . . .”).
25. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79 (George Simpson trans.,
Macmillan Co. 1960) (1893).
26. See Olick et al., supra note 24, at 20 (“Durkheimian approaches are often accused—and
often rightly so—of being radically anti-individualist, conceptualizing society in disembodied
terms, as an entity existing in and of itself, over and above the individuals who comprise it.”);
OSIEL, supra note 5, at 33 (“Durkheim’s approach leaves no room for dissenting (or even
concurring) opinions . . . .”).
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founding father of collective memory, Maurice Halbwachs,27 broke
from his mentor by more carefully characterizing a pluralistic
collective, theorizing that there are as many collective memories as
there are groups comprising the society.28 Yet Halbwachs still viewed
collective memory as a metaphysical phenomenon that operates
independently from any individual and saw individual memory as
necessarily social.29
Since Halbwachs’s influential work, collective memory has shaken
off its monolithic Durkheimian roots and become more
democratized.30 Bucking a conception of collective memory that
operates independently from individuals, scholars now view collective
memory as more dependent on individuals—leading to a view of
memory as pluralistic rather than unitary.31 With Durkheim’s
monolithic foundations representing one extreme, the other extreme
represents the mere aggregation of individual remembrance of an
event—which might be more aptly described as collected memory.32
This Note adopts a concept of collective memory that settles
between these extremes.33 On the one hand, collective memory must
consider the role of individual remembrance, especially that of
influential leaders in society.34 Unlike Halbwachs’s vision, collective
memory should not treat individual memory as entirely dependent on

27. See Mary Douglas, Introduction to MAURICE HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY
1, 6 (Francis J. Ditter, Jr. & Vida Yazdi Ditter trans., Harper Colophon Books 1980) (1950)
(discussing how Halbwachs “called upon Émile Durkheim” to train Halbwachs “as a
sociologist”); Sarah Gensburger, Halbwachs’ Studies in Collective Memory: A Founding Text for
Contemporary ‘Memory Studies’?, 16 J. CLASSICAL SOCIO. 396, 397–99 (2016) (surveying
references to Halbwachs as a founder of collective memory studies).
28. See HALBWACHS, supra note 27, at 77 (stating that each group “has its own memory”).
29. See MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 38 (Lewis A. Coser ed., trans.,
1992) (“There is no point in seeking where [memories] are preserved in my brain . . . to which I
alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at
any time give me the means to reconstruct them . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Olick, supra note 8, at 338 & n.9 (noting the “significant sociological examples”
of the shift toward memory focused on individualistic principles).
31. See id. at 338 (“There is no doubt, from this perspective, that social frameworks shape
what individuals remember, but ultimately it is only individuals who do the remembering.”).
32. See id. (calling the aggregation of individual memory “collective memory”).
33. While a more democratized but hierarchical collective memory concept dominates
contemporary memory studies, a Durkheimian approach remains a fruitful tool to analyze the
collective memory of an event—a tool this Note will invoke. For an excellent example of this
tool’s use, see OSIEL, supra note 5, at 31–32.
34. See Olick, supra note 8, at 338–39 (“[A]ccounts of the collective memory of any group or
society are . . . particularly of those with access to the means of cultural production or whose
opinions are more highly valued.”).
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one’s social environment.35 On the other hand, collective memory must
still consider “what is genuinely social about memory,” including
memory that operates independently from the interests of individuals,
such as deeply persisting historical narratives, myths, and folklore.36 In
sum, collective memory in this Note appreciates both individuals’
memories (with appropriate weight given to their role in the
community) and socially pervasive memories.37
B. Memory Competition and the Meaning of Memory
Collective memory—as both pluralistic and social—is an
inherently competitive phenomenon.38 The structure of this
competition operates in two arenas: (1) between sources of memory
and (2) between the memories themselves. First, sources of memory
represent past events through visuals, slogans, and physical spaces to
make meaning of the past.39 Some sources of memory can carry more
credence than others. For example, sources of “disciplinary
knowledge,”40 including prominent political figures and institutions,
academies, and museums, can more effectively craft interpretations of
past events. Meanwhile, grassroots sources can challenge more
disciplined sources of memory, thus creating a hierarchical landscape

35. See id. at 338 (arguing that “social frameworks shape what individuals remember, but
ultimately it is only individuals who do the remembering”).
36. See id. at 342 (claiming that without examining how “long-term structures” impact “what
societies remember or commemorate” society is “unable to provide good explanations of
mythology, tradition, heritage, and the like”).
37. A major limitation of this Note is its lack of empirically measured collective memory.
Instead, the Note only observes when individuals’ expressions about the past appear to manifest
collective memory. Some scholars have studied collective memory for other historical events
through more rigorous methodologies, including studying national library holdings or conducting
field interviews. See, e.g., Eric Langenbacher, The Mastered Past? Collective Memory Trends in
Germany Since Unification, 28 GERMAN POL. & SOC’Y 42, 57–61 (2010) [hereinafter
Langenbacher, The Mastered Past?] (analyzing, using keywords, the holdings of the Deutsche
Nationalbibliothek); Howard Schuman & Jacqueline Scott, Generations and Collective Memories,
54 AM. SOCIO. REV. 359, 362 (1989) (describing the method of interviewing to obtain data on
collective memory of major historical events). Similar studies on U.S. criminal trials would be a
worthy endeavor but are beyond the scope of this Note.
38. See, e.g., Langenbacher, The Mastered Past?, supra note 37, at 42, 59 (observing multiple
competing collective memories vying for influence in German society).
39. JAMES FENTRESS & CHRIS WICKHAM, SOCIAL MEMORY 47 (1992).
40. See Ron Eyerman, The Past in the Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory, in
THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY READER, supra note 19, at 304, 306 (comparing institutionalized
disciplinary knowledge with narratives that “are less institutionalized, more open and
malleable”).
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of memory sources.41 Second, the memories themselves—often
bolstered by competing sources—compete for dominance. Memories
of an event can jockey for representation and influence dramatic shifts
in the event’s dominant narrative.42
The stakes of this competition reveal why collective memory—and
thus this Note—ultimately matters. Collective memory affects
attitudes about the past that manifest as values and actions in the
present.43 In particular, framing the memory of a discrete event into
larger memory structures, such as narratives that capture historical
racism writ large, can imbue a discrete event with heightened force.44
For example, situating a discrete event such as George Floyd’s murder
into the context of cumulative narratives of racism can inform political
responses, business decisions, and social sentiments.45 Compare, for
instance, two different framings of George Floyd’s murder within the
following memory structures: the murder as part of America’s
irreparably racist past,46 against the murder, and especially Chauvin’s
conviction, as part of America’s evolution toward a more racially
equitable society.47 These respective framings impact, for example,

41. See BODNAR, supra note 7, at 13–14 (comparing public memory, or interpretations of the
past from cultural leaders and authorities, with vernacular memory, or interpretations of the past
from the community level).
42. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 14, at 208–10 (outlining the competition between
hegemonic liberal and conservative accounts of Watergate and noting the role of minority
narratives within those memories); Langenbacher, The Mastered Past?, supra note 37, at 59
(observing multiple competing collective memories vying for influence in German society).
43. See Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a Factor, supra note 11, at 22 (“Collective
identities are parts of cultures and allow individuals to orient themselves and to place themselves
into a larger, meaning-providing context.”); OSIEL, supra note 5, at 18 n.28 (noting that collective
memory helps “define what . . . people have in common and . . . guide[s] their collective action”).
44. See, e.g., David Cunningham, Colleen Nugent & Caitlin Slodden, The Durability of
Collective Memory: Reconciling the “Greensboro Massacre,” 88 SOC. FORCES 1517, 1530–31
(2010) (observing contextualization of the Greensboro Massacre within “the history of racial
institutional barriers in North Carolina and recent associated battles between the CWP and
klan”).
45. See, e.g., Ram Subramanian & Leily Arzy, State Policing Reforms Since George Floyd’s
Murder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 21, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/state-policing-reforms-george-floyds-murder [https://perma.cc/VSH7-D2FR] (outlining
the array of police reform efforts across the United States following the murder of George Floyd).
46. See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 263,
287–88 (2015) (describing the marginalization of Blacks and Native Americans as “an essential,
perhaps irredeemable, truth about the nation’s character”).
47. See, e.g., Larry J. Griffin & Kenneth A. Bollen, What Do These Memories Do? Civil
Rights Remembrance and Racial Attitudes, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 594, 600 (2009) (describing
hegemonic memory of the Civil Rights Movement as “one of incompleteness underpinned by
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how political leaders call for radical or marginal change and how
people form their self-image in relation to one another.48 Competition
between these kinds of memory structures will likely continue for years
after the George Floyd murder. This Note primarily concerns the
criminal trial’s contributions to the discrete collective memory of an
offense. However, contextualizing prominent criminal acts within a
history of racism, sexism, economic inequality, or other historical
wrongs exemplifies how collective memory keeps the past alive.
II. THE CRIMINAL TRIAL AS A SITE OF MEMORY
Trials for prominent criminal offenses serve as sites of memory.
This Part discusses how. While other elements of the criminal trial are
significant,49 this Section will examine the primary contributors: (1) the
constituent storytellers of the trial, namely the prosecutor, defendant,
and judge; (2) the capacity of criminal charges to capture the gravity of
the underlying act; and (3) the impact of the jury in creating an
authoritative narrative of the crime. Subsequently, this Section
analyzes how the trial’s primary memory competitor, mass media,
interacts with the trial to create collective memory. But first, this Part
turns to political trials scholarship and its relationship as a foil to this
Note’s criminal trials inquiry.
A. Memory of Political Trials as Foil for Criminal Trials
At the outset of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial, few doubted the
defendant’s fate. In fact, Eichmann’s role was not so much as a
defendant, but instead “simply to be there, in the glass booth” as the
trial “[gave] voice to the Jewish people.”50 As dozens of Holocaust
survivors testified, Eichmann became an object of a greater mission: to
frame the Holocaust as a “tale about the Jewish community’s collective

optimism: important gains have been made, but the ‘rights revolution’ has unfinished business
that must be addressed”).
48. See Langenbacher, Collective Memory as a Factor, supra note 11, at 32 (“[I]t matters
immensely which values vie to be allocated, how they are framed as alternatives, and which ones
emerge to actually influence outcomes. There is an inescapable dimension of power and
competition involved in all ideational phenomena.”).
49. This Note does not hope to achieve an exhaustive analysis of criminal trials as
contributors to collective memory. Further research into the role of eyewitnesses, expert
witnesses, appeals, and trial attendees, among others, would be valuable additions to the
literature.
50. TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 358 (1993).
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victimization, suffering, resistance, resurrection . . . , and, finally,
redemption as a powerful nation-state.”51
Noble as this cause may have been, Israel’s unabashed illiberalism
in the Eichmann trial became the topic of great controversy and
spurred heated, theoretical discussions on the appropriate purpose of
a criminal trial. Most prominently, Hannah Arendt derided the
Eichmann proceedings as a “show trial” to “raise the specter of a
Stalinist fraud.”52 She famously argued instead that “[t]he purpose of a
[criminal] trial is to render justice, and nothing else.”53 Criminal law’s
“main business,” in Arendt’s estimation, is to “weigh the charges
brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due
punishment.”54
While this viewpoint may sound uncontroversial to a legal
professional, Arendt nonetheless has her detractors. Some argue that
no properly liberal criminal trial could have adequately captured the
gravity and complexity of the Holocaust but that a criminal trial was
still the appropriate venue to institutionalize a narrative of the mass
crime.55 Extrapolating upon this claim, legal scholar Mark Osiel argues
that criminal trials conducted in the aftermath of administrative
massacre can and should create social solidarity through the intentional
creation of collective memory.56 Osiel posits that such criminal trials,
which may strike liberals as antithetical to fairness, need not be viewed
as pernicious.57 Similarly, legal scholar Lawrence Douglas
characterizes Arendt’s view as a “crabbed and needlessly restrictive
vision of the trial as [a] legal form.”58 To be sure, Douglas concedes
that a political trial requires a certain level of institutional legitimacy
to not be seen as a “legal farce,” which would significantly hinder the
pedagogical and collective memory impact of the trial.59
51. OSIEL, supra note 5.
52. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN
THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 3 (2001).
53. ARENDT, supra note 16.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 169
(1986) (discussing the practical advantages of utilizing the trial form at Nuremberg).
56. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 59–60. Osiel defines administrative massacre as “large-scale
violation of basic human rights to life and liberty by the central state in a systematic and organized
fashion, often against its own citizens, generally in a climate of war.” Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 59–60.
58. DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 2.
59. See id. (“The danger of turning a trial into a pedagogic spectacle is that it becomes a legal
farce.”).
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While these theorists utilize—perhaps haphazardly—the term
“criminal trial” in their dialogue, they focus specifically on trials for
crimes committed in the context of mass atrocity.60 For Osiel and
Douglas, the term criminal trial appears to be a proxy for a political
trial that sacrifices some of the defendant’s rights and tries the
defendant for mass crimes that occurred in jurisdictions geographically
or temporally beyond the reach of the regime holding the trial.61 For
the sake of clarity, this Note simply labels these “political trials.”62
While commentary abounds on the nexus of political trials and
collective memory,63 this Note is not focused on adding to that
literature. Instead, this Note focuses on prominent U.S. criminal trials.
Despite the difference in scope, political trials scholarship
provides a helpful foundation upon which to analyze U.S. criminal
trials. Political trials, such as the Eichmann trial, are especially effective
at institutionalizing historical narratives, in part because the court adds
a broader social goal to the trial’s traditional purposes. Assuming the
trial establishes baseline institutional legitimacy, the political trial is
more likely to succeed in its pedagogical goals when the court and its
parties ratchet up the dramatics, even at the expense of the defendant’s

60. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 1 (defining the focus of Osiel’s study as “the role of criminal
trials in democratic transitions” (emphasis added)); DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 2–3 (declaring
“the criminal trial” as the focus of a survey of four Holocaust trials).
61. See, e.g., OSIEL, supra note 5, at 14–15 (introducing the trials of Klaus Barbie, Argentine
military juntas, and Adolf Eichmann, which fit the description, as subjects of the study). The rights
surrendered, and norms perverted, in political trials can vary from context to context. Some
include surrendering the right to counsel, to exculpatory information, and to cross-examine the
prosecution’s witnesses. Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam
Hussein, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257, 271–73 (2007). A defendant could be charged with a crime ex
post facto or lack proper appeal rights. Id. at 274, 277–78. The trial could gain such wide notoriety
as to influence the procedure in court or remain so secretive as to escape public scrutiny. See Jens
Meierhenrich & Devin O. Pendas, “The Justice of My Cause Is Clear, but There’s Politics to Fear,”
in POLITICAL TRIALS IN THEORY AND HISTORY, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that either extreme
of publicity can make a trial political).
62. Defining “political trial” has been the subject of much scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
Meierhenrich & Pendas, supra note 61, at 3–5 (describing scholarly contributions to the scope of
“political trials”); Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE
L.J. 75, 76 (2005) (defining political trials as trials against a person who “engag[ed] in political
opposition or . . . violat[ed] a broad and generally applicable law that is not usually enforced,
enforced strictly, or enforced with a strict punishment, except against political opponents of the
state or the government”); Meierhenrich & Pendas, supra note 61, at 48–49 (including in the scope
of political trials those that “crystallize[] or communicate[] a political conflict, often but not
necessarily, over the distribution of social resources of one sort or another; or courtroom
proceedings [that] are directed at the defeat of a political enemy, real or imagined”).
63. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 2–3 (introducing several scholars who have
commented on the topic).
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rights.64 The criminal trial’s structural and substantive differences offer
an opportunity to counteranalogize and determine how the criminal
trial is uniquely positioned to contribute to collective memory.
Using the political trial as a foil, this Part explores the ways in
which the U.S. criminal trial could still create collective memory, while
maintaining the defendant’s constitutional rights and upholding the
rule of law. Whereas the political trial crafts its narratives purposefully,
this Part focuses on incidental collective memory manufacture in
prominent criminal trials.65 This Note’s view of the criminal trial’s
scope will begin with opening statements and conclude with the verdict.
Accordingly, any impact of the pre-trial investigation will be
considered only insofar as the trial filters that information. Further,
post-verdict contributions, especially at sentencing, will be left for
valuable discussion beyond this Note.
B. Storytelling in Criminal Court
The criminal trial story is unlike most any story told in real life. In
contrast to common story structures that follow roughly chronological
and unidirectional paths, the trial, on account of its adversarial nature,
necessarily produces a structure of narratives and counternarratives.66
Memory studies scholars have observed that organizing a
historical archive into a narrative story bolsters the ability of a
community to collectively remember an event.67 In this regard, political
and criminal trials share a similar quality. In the political trial context,
consider, for example, the troves of documentation collected for the
Nuremberg proceedings following World War II.68 Set aside as an
64. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 80 (describing the collective memory value of “engaging and
compelling[] stories [at trial] that linger in the mind”).
65. This Note claims no hard-and-fast rule based on outside viewership or scholarly
commentary for a trial to have “prominence.” Rather, for this Note’s purpose, a prominent trial
is one followed by the general public as a result of the crime having a specific sociopolitical
meaning to those beyond the victim’s and perpetrator’s immediate community. By “specific,” this
Note argues that the sociopolitical meaning must deal with more than the mere fact that the crime
occurred. All murders have a sociopolitical meaning, which is why the criminal justice system
punishes the crime so severely. The Author aims to narrow the definition to crimes where the
specific defendant or victim, number of victims, means of committing the act, etc., hold
significance.
66. JANET COTTERILL, LANGUAGE AND POWER IN COURT 25 (2003).
67. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 80 (“If the law is to influence collective memory, it must tell
stories that are engaging and compelling, stories that linger in the mind because they are
responsive to the public’s central concerns.”).
68. See DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 12 (describing the examination of over one hundred
thousand German documents, millions of feet of film, and twenty-five thousand photographs).
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archive, this vast evidentiary stockpile of Nazi war crimes might serve
equally well as a heinous paperweight. Brought to life as a narrative
account by the Nuremberg prosecutors, the record produced the
“greatest history seminar ever held.”69
This Section examines how the criminal trial’s storytelling
structure enables and constrains the process’s mnemonic (that is,
memory) capabilities through its main constituent storytellers, namely
(1) the prosecutor, (2) the defendant, and (3) the judge. In sum, the
contributions of narratives and counternarratives to the public
discourse can craft a rich framework of collective memories.
1. Prosecutor: “The People” as Victim. The prosecutor’s high
reasonable doubt standard for each element of the offense influences
the state’s narrative approach. To succeed at trial, the prosecution
needs “to present a single, linear story” to avoid incoherence that
might lead jurors to detect reasonable doubt.70 This distinctive
approach might be most aptly observed in witness examination, where
“clarity of the elicited testimony is of paramount importance.”71
Unlike the aggrieved in a civil suit, the victim in a criminal trial
must cede the stage to the state. This construct creates an “asymmetry”
at trial, whereby the victim is subjugated and “loses control of how his
or her story is presented.”72 Viewed in one light, the inability of the
victim or victim’s family to control the narrative of the crime told in
court is in direct conflict with a common form of collective memory
building, whereby the direct victim-group’s story is transmitted
throughout the community.73 But viewed in another light, one could
argue that displacing, or minimizing, the directly impacted victim helps
to effectively craft public memory through disciplinary knowledge
from government officials.74 Indeed, the prosecution, standing in for
the community and the victim, could more authoritatively construct
collective memory by symbolically standing for “the People.”

69. Id. at 2.
70. COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 30.
71. Id. at 130.
72. See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 863, 866
(1996). By contrast, counsel “devoted to his or her client’s interests” represents the defendant
directly. Id.
73. See Eyerman, supra note 40 (describing the ways that groups “exert . . . discursive
influence” in their interpretation of past collective traumas).
74. See BODNAR, supra note 7, at 247 (describing the advantages that purveyors of “official
culture” have over “ordinary people” in creating collective memory).
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In prominent homicide trials, a victim’s inability to testify raises a
challenge for the prosecutor to tell a story with a sympathetic
protagonist. But the victim’s voice can come in through other means.
Consider the strategy of the prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson trial,
where the state admitted recordings of Nicole Brown Simpson’s two
911 calls.75 Introducing the victim’s voice raises fairness concerns for
the defendant, as the prosecution and the jury could draw inferences
from ambiguous evidence without the opportunity for crossexamination.76 However, the exclusion of much of Simpson’s domestic
abuse also illustrates how a dead victim’s silence can be reinforced by
the law and kept beyond the reach of a prosecutor’s storytelling.77
In sum, while the prosecutor can find ways to weave in the victim’s
voice at trial, the prosecutor’s control over one side of the story could
silence the narratives that a victim or victim-group seeks to support.
2. Defendant: The “Silent” Object of the Trial. Whereas the
prosecution seeks coherence in its narratives to secure a guilty verdict,
the defense’s counternarratives can thrive by highlighting incoherence.
In the French political trial against Klaus Barbie, a former SS officer of
Vichy France,78 Barbie’s defense attorney exploited a glaring tension
between French society’s “deliberately constructed . . . myth of united
resistance” against the Nazis and the French prosecution’s focus on
Barbie’s deportation of Jews—which necessarily implicated French
collaboration with the Nazis.79 Whereas French leaders hoped the
pedagogic trial would honor French resistance,80 the trial’s focus on
crimes against humanity enabled the defense to highlight the

75. COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 55.
76. See id. (stating that the prosecutor told the jury it would hear a 911 tape that would help
the members “discern from the tone of her voice and the things that she says that she is a tough
woman, but that she’s also afraid and intimidated” (internal citations omitted)).
77. See Gewirtz, supra note 72, at 867 n.6 (describing the significance of Judge Lance Ito’s
evidentiary rulings).
78. See generally Klaus Barbie: The Butcher of Lyon, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nikolaus-klaus-barbie-the-butcher-of-lyon
[https://perma.cc/D6AL-2QSW], (last updated July 12, 2018) (providing a summary of the life and
trial of Klaus Barbie).
79. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 113, 113 n.109 (“Barbie was convicted for his role in the
deportation of French Jews.”).
80. DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 185. The French prosecutors could only try Barbie for crimes
against humanity, instead of war crimes, due to an expired statute of limitations. Id. at 191. This
charge limited the ability to discuss crimes against French resistance fighters. Id.
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pervasiveness of French-Nazi collaboration in the Final Solution, thus
putting the entire French society on trial.81
In U.S. criminal trials, the defense can take similar advantage of
narrative incoherence, though less informed by historiographical
conflict and more by tension within the prosecution’s micronarrative
form. A dramatic example of this tactic from the O.J. Simpson trial
occurred when the prosecution asked Simpson to put on the glove
allegedly worn during the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron
Goldman.82 Breaking his long silence at the trial, Simpson struggled to
put the gloves on; he stated, “[T]hey’re too small,” which inspired the
now-famous phrase from the defense’s closing argument, “If it doesn’t
fit, you must acquit.”83
The defense’s counternarratives at trial, which seek to exploit and
highlight reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, complicate efforts
to create Durkheimian notions of monolithic memory by slipping
competing memories of the offense into the public discourse.84
However, under modern collective memory conceptions, the
defendant’s counternarratives provide a two-fold boost to the trial’s
ability to create collective memory. First, the presence of
counternarratives in a full and fair defense legitimates the entire trial
process and gives credence to the collective memory that flows
therefrom.85 And second, the presence of counternarratives compels a
more critical lens for the jury and the public to process the parties’
arguments into a collective narrative of the criminal act.86 In other

81. This example highlights an exceptional case of a defense attorney’s contributions to
collective memory. More often, political trials are designed to constrain the defense. Supra note
61. For example, the Hutu defendants in the Rwandan gacaca trials after the genocide in Rwanda
faced little hope of a full and fair defense, as the mass number of defendants had little access to
defense counsel. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 124 (1998).
82. COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 111.
83. Id.
84. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 33 (“Durkheim’s approach leaves no room for dissenting (or even
concurring) opinions.”).
85. Cf. id. at 128–29 (arguing that reciprocity in narrative balance could foster a sense of
reciprocal solidarity but asserting criminal law does not facilitate such a narrative balance).
86. See id. at 52 (“Narratives are valuable regardless of their persuasiveness, because they
involve ‘argumentation whose purpose is to bring to light and provoke contestation over implicit
rules that constrain the production of new ideas and determine the boundaries of political
communities.’”).
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words, the resulting memory competition has inherent value by stirring
the public to more critically process the offense and why it matters.87
3. Judge as Gatekeeper of Evidence. The criminal trial is a struggle
over storytelling in which the judge guards the boundaries of “what
stories may be told at trial, how stories must be told, who is the
appropriate audience, [and] how stories must be heard.”88 In the
political trial context, judges understand they are writing history.89
Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement at the Nuremberg
proceedings highlights this history-making role: “The record on which
we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge us tomorrow.”90 But that does not stop tribunals for political
trials from having a role in what history is allowed into the courtroom
and on what terms. For example, the rules governing the Iraqi Special
Tribunal trial against Saddam Hussein made excluding irrelevant or
unduly prejudicial evidence discretionary,
thus allowing the
prosecution to “discuss materials unrelated to the charges against
[Hussein].”91
Judges in U.S. criminal trials, bound by stricter rules of evidence
and constitutional protections, can still distort history through their
evidentiary rulings.92 Hardly a pejorative, distortion is the intent. For
example, relevance cordons off evidence from the trial’s narratives that
does not bear on resolving the action before the court93; the prohibition
on hearsay filters out facts that may very well be true94; and limiting
instructions require the jury to only use certain evidence to evaluate X

87. Id. While counternarratives can spur a society to engage more with a prominent offense,
a variety of factors could lead a memory to obtain dominance or for memories to maintain fierce
competition. For an example of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.2 (discussing counternarratives
in the Derek Chauvin trial).
88. Gewirtz, supra note 72, at 863.
89. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 82.
90. Id.
91. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 281 (discussing the Iraqi Special Tribunal’s permissive
evidentiary rules).
92. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 83–84. The judge’s role in memory making is hardly confined to
evidentiary rulings. See infra Part II.D (discussing the judge’s role in venue); infra Part II.E
(discussing the judge’s role in managing media access to the courtroom). This discussion is limited
to evidentiary rulings on account of their direct relationship to the nature of the narratives the
respective parties can raise at trial.
93. FED. R. EVID. 401(b).
94. FED. R. EVID. 802.
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but not Y.95 This brief sampling of crucial evidentiary rules96 highlights
how the judge, as arbiter of evidence, limits the full context of a
criminal offense for the jury and distorts how the ordinary public might
draw inferences based on the factual record.97 Nonetheless, the judge
primarily serves an enabling function for the respective parties’
storytelling, thus making the judge a significant, yet indirect,
contributor to collective memory.
C. Capacity To Capture the Gravity of the Offense
While criminal statutes provide legal shape to shared moral
sentiments, criminal statutes at trial may ultimately constrain crafting
shared memory. Sociologist of crime David Garland drew upon
Durkheim when he argued that the collective conscience of a society is
“protected by a strict code of penal law, which—unlike most law in
modern society—does evoke deep-seated emotions and a sense of the
sacred.”98 Put another way, a criminal statute crystallizes in code the
public’s common values regarding a particular offense.99
In political trials, where forging collective memory is an inherent
goal,100 criminal statutes “provide the minimally necessary elements for
telling a legal story of administrative massacre.”101 In some instances,
such as the Nuremberg proceedings, concerns about ex post facto
prosecution are set aside and charges are created for the defendants.102
95. FED. R. EVID. 105.
96. Other evidentiary rulings and decisions are crucial to the storytelling process in court.
Notably, the judge’s analysis under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 516 U.S. 869 (1995),
for qualifying an expert witness will affect the ability of the parties to explain the facts of the case
to the jury. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (1999) (explaining the judge’s
“gatekeeping” role under Daubert). Evidentiary rulings are reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion, requiring clear error to overrule. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997)
(“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”).
97. By contrast, the public remains unconstrained to contextualize the crime within more
comprehensive narrative frameworks, free to begin and end the story where deemed appropriate,
and able to link the present crime to historical trends no matter their legal relevance to
determining the question of guilt or innocence.
98. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 57 (1990).
99. See id. at 58 (stating that criminal statutes are akin to a “seal . . . to hot wax” in how they
shape the public’s common views of a particular act).
100. Cf. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 18 (describing collective memory as an aim of “criminal law”).
For Osiel, the term criminal trial appears to be a proxy for what this Note terms a political trial.
Supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
101. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 71.
102. Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 1946), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-a-dan
gerous-precedent/306492 [https://perma.cc/W3UU-6TJR]. Some political trials that respect the
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The offense selected by the prosecutor then becomes the “theoretical
construct” under which the story of the crime will be told.103 However,
for political trials, the legal form that drives the prosecutor’s narratives
at trial will also be “situated within a larger narrative of national crisis
and rejuvenation.”104
But for U.S. trials for prominent criminal acts,105 the generic legal
form of any criminal offense constrains the ability to craft a narrative
in court, and for good reason. To start with, the prosecutor’s role in
first pursuing and then selecting the charges presents an asymmetry
between the parties in crafting a narrative of the offense.106 As
explained below, the elements of the offense become boundaries for
the parties’ narratives in court. But one party’s ability to set those
boundaries reflects an imbalance driven in part by the prosecutor’s
motivations.107 While a prosecutor could have collective memory in
mind when deciding charges, the prosecutor will focus on other factors,
including the likelihood of obtaining a conviction.108
Once the charge is selected and the defendant is on trial, the
elements of the offense become the boundaries of the narratives and
counternarratives of each party.109 Rules of evidence, particularly the
requirement for relevance, guard the prosecutor’s presentation of
evidence by filtering evidence extraneous to the objective of proving

principle of legality fail to capture the gravity of the offense. For example, the 1963 trial against
several Auschwitz guards featured charges of Mordlust, or killing another “from thirst of blood.”
DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 189. Because the prosecutors had to prove “thirst” beyond acceptable
limits of Nazi law, only the most barbaric killings at Auschwitz were chargeable. See id. at 188–
89.
103. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 71.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (outlining within the scope of “prominence” a
requirement of an extra-legal sociopolitical meaning to the community).
106. See Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
800–01 (2016) (describing the prosecutor’s power over charging decisions).
107. See id. at 776 (“[P]rosecutors are motivated by political incentives; by professional
norms; by their own conceptions of duty and justice; and by other personal motivations that are
best understood as agency costs.”).
108. See id. at 779 (“[A] prosecutor may derive greater political (or personal) benefits from
bringing one case with little prospect of victory (say, against a particularly unpopular defendant,
but where evidence of guilt is weak) than she would from bringing ten cases where conviction was
guaranteed.”).
109. See Lawrence Douglas, The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the
Courtroom, 14 EUR. REV. 513, 517 (2006) (arguing that one “set of legal filters that shapes the
uses of history and memory at trial are the crimes with which the accused is charged”).
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the elements of the offense.110 Further, the principle of personal
liability—whereby the defendant can only be held to account for his
own conduct and not his association with wrongdoers111—limits the
capacity of the prosecutor to contextualize the accused’s behavior as
part of a larger sociopolitical trend.112 The presence of these limitations
differs markedly from the “fluid narrative form” one might see at a
political trial, where the constraints of evidence rules go relatively
unguarded, and the oft-predetermined outcome makes fitting evidence
into legal elements of the offense more of a box-checking exercise.113
D. Jury: Proxy for the People’s Judgment
The jury’s composition, deliberation, and ultimate verdict play a
crucial role in a trial’s memory-creating ability. In political trials, the
verdict itself is less important than the trial’s capacity to present
collective representations of the past and create public discussion
about the trial.114 Indeed, for trials where the outcome is largely
predetermined, the jury’s work is a matter of going through the
motions to deliver its verdict.115 Accordingly, the intrigue that drives
public attention to a political trial—and thus enables a political trial’s
collective memory manufacture—resides in the task of laying out a
substantive account of the accused and others’ wrongdoings.116
In U.S. criminal trials, the verdict can carry far greater mnemonic
power. While this Note views the jury as just one significant source of
collective memory, some view the jury’s verdict as an “authoritative

110. See id. at 516 (“[T]he rules of evidence and proof . . . control the production of
knowledge in a criminal trial.”).
111. See GABRIEL HALLEVY, THE MATRIX OF DERIVATIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 20 (2012)
(“The essence of the principle of personal liability is the imposition of criminal liability and
punishment on individuals who have chosen to commit an offense by exercising their own
choice.”). The principle of personal liability is in tension with theories of criminal culpability, like
accomplice liability and conspiracy, but some see these theories as limited derivations of personal
liability. See id. (“The principle of personal liability makes it possible to impose criminal liability
on individuals other than the perpetrators for the exact role they played in carrying out the
offense.”).
112. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 61 (explaining that the principle of personal culpability can
limit the ability of the prosecutor to “paint the larger tableaux”).
113. Douglas, supra note 109, at 516–17.
114. OSIEL, supra note 5, at 39.
115. See Peterson, supra note 61, at 260–61 (describing the extent to which the verdict is a
“foregone conclusion” as a factor in categorizing a trial as political).
116. See Gewirtz, supra note 72, at 865.
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version of the crime narrative.”117 But several factors can influence the
relative authority of the verdict. Consider first how jury composition
affects the construction of narratives and counternarratives by the
advocates as described above. Through voir dire, the parties can seek
to match their intended narrative approaches to the persons selected
or rejected.118 Voir dire provides an opportunity for the attorneys and
the judge to filter apparent political, professional, and personal bias
among the given jury pool.119 Once seated, the advocates—even
indirectly through witness examination—must adapt their storytelling
to the jury before them.120
Jury composition also impacts public perception of the legitimacy
of the verdict. Consider first the role of venue in altering the jury pool.
On the one hand, the public perception of the verdict can be bolstered
by the appearance of independence and by efforts to limit the role of
emotion in jury decision-making. For example, Judge Richard Matsch
decided in United States v. McVeigh121 to move the trial outside of
Oklahoma,122 where the defendant killed 168 people by bombing a
federal building in Oklahoma City.123 Specifically, Judge Matsch was
concerned that Oklahoman jurors would have a “personal stake in the
outcome” or “a sense of obligation to reach a result [that] will find
general acceptance in the relevant audience.”124
On the other hand, jury “selection” by venue can directly
undermine the legitimacy of the verdict as well. Prior to the trial of four
Los Angeles police officers who were filmed beating Rodney King,125
Judge Stanley Weisberg moved the trial’s venue from Los Angeles

117. COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 59. Arguably, the jury could be considered one of the
“constituents” of a trial, as discussed in Part II.B. However, the passive nature of the jury suffices
to keep it analytically separate.
118. See id. at 13 (“It is clearly a highly attractive proposition for lawyers to be able to
influence the configuration of a jury panel—to design the audience—in such a way that they may
be predisposed to respond favourably to their particular arguments.”).
119. Briana M. Clark, Social Dominance Orientation: Detecting Racial Bias in Prospective
Jurors, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 614, 619 (2021).
120. See COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 121 (“[T]he jury [is] more or less explicitly identified
as the ratified recipient of trial talk.”).
121. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
122. JODY LENEÉ MADEIRA, KILLING MCVEIGH: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MYTH OF
CLOSURE 139 (2012).
123. Oklahoma City Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/hist
ory/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing [https://perma.cc/UT4P-ALFR].
124. MADEIRA, supra note 122.
125. Powell v. Superior Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 785, 789 (1991).
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County to Ventura County126—a county that had a 79.1 percent white
population and 2.3 percent Black population.127 By effectively
whitewashing the jury pool, Judge Weisberg helped produce a jury with
no Black members and only two people of color.128 A defense attorney
for one of the officers said after the verdict, “I wouldn’t say the case
was won [after the venue change], but if it hadn’t been granted, the case
would have been lost, no question.”129 The predetermination resulting
from this kind of venue change directly sullies the legitimacy of the
verdict and creates a collective memory of the crime focused on the
resulting failure of the judicial branch to hold the police accountable.
Lastly, the jury deliberation process, like the composition of the
jury itself, could influence the collective memory of the underlying
crime. First, verdicts, unlike many other decisions in court, almost
never come with an explanation as to what testimony, arguments, or
even emotions led to the outcome.130 This unambiguous account by the
jury would satisfy Durkheimian notions of collective memory by
presenting a simplistic narrative of the crime to the public.131 But in a
legal system that champions reasoned judgment and shuns
arbitrariness, such an “authoritative” account could undermine the
legitimacy of the verdict to some public onlookers. Second, the
duration of the jury deliberation could play a role in public interaction
with the criminal trial. While the public generally gains no access to the
contents of the “black box,” the public does gain access to how long
the jury spends in there.132 One could argue that a deliberation too
126. Note, Out of the Frying Pan or into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue After Rodney
King, 106 HARV. L. REV. 705, 705 n.3 (1993).
127. Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the “Rodney King” Case:
An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 215, 216 n.5 (1993). By contrast, Los Angeles had a
56.1 percent white population and 11.2 percent Black population. Id.
128. The jury composition was ten white jurors, one Hispanic juror, and one Asian juror. Id.
129. David Margolick, As Venues Are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race
Should Play, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/23/us/as-venues-arechanged-many-ask-how-important-a-role-race-should-play.html [https://perma.cc/6EPQ-LTRN].
130. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017) (“A general rule has evolved
to give substantial protection to verdict finality and to assure jurors that, once their verdict has
been entered, it will not later be called into question based on the comments or conclusions they
expressed during deliberations.”).
131. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 33 (stating that “Durkheim’s approach leaves no room for
dissenting (or even concurring) opinions”).
132. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin
Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmermanverdict-trayvon-martin.html [https://perma.cc/NA9J-8XCG] (“The jury [for the trial of George
Zimmerman], which had been sequestered since June 24, deliberated 16 hours and 20 minutes
over two days.”).
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short could have cross-cutting impacts on views on the verdict. For
some, a quick verdict could show that the decision was obvious and
authoritative; for others, a quick verdict might indicate arbitrariness or
a lack of reasoned judgment.133
E. Media as a Memory Competitor of the Criminal Trial
Undergirding competition between collective memories is a
competition between sources of memory.134 This Section will focus on
the criminal trial’s primary competition: mass media.135
1. Mass Media, Criminal Acts, and Collective Memory. Mass
media is a significant creator of collective memory, especially given
modern technological advancements in the media industry.136 By
selecting, articulating, and transmitting reported events, media “endow
[events] with public significance” and raise public awareness of events
such that they are “channeled and sedimented in collective
memory.”137 In particular, photos and videos have become potent tools
to “bring[] to visibility what ordinarily lies outside the range of vision
of all but a small minority of direct witnesses.”138
By utilizing photos and videos of criminal acts, mass media
burnishes its collective memory might by bringing the viewer a pseudoexperience of the crime itself.139 The democratization of video
technology through recorders and cell phone cameras has led to the
proliferation of “citizen journalism,” which can document crimes on-

133. See COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 227 (“[T]he length of the deliberation period [for the
O.J. Simpson trial] was judged to have been indecently short, considering the amount and the
complexity of the evidence to be evaluated.”). The same could go for a lengthy deliberation—
whereby some could view the decision as a close call and unauthoritative, while others could
imbue the verdict with greater legitimacy on account of its nuance.
134. See FENTRESS & WICKHAM, supra note 39 (discussing the interplay of memory sourced
from sound and images).
135. Other sources of memory for criminal offenses are significant and worthy of further
research. Some to consider include memorials, protests, history books, and legislative
investigations.
136. JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE HISTORICAL PAST 114
(2016).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 114, 124.
139. The experience is a pseudo-reality because video retains a temporal and spatial
separation from the actual lived experience. Id. at 148.
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site.140 Consider, for example, the role of the media in disseminating
the footage of the four Los Angeles police officers kicking, beating,
and tasering Rodney King in 1991.141 The footage, filmed on a video
camera by citizen George Holliday outside of his home, sparked nearinstantaneous international news coverage.142 In Los Angeles
specifically, the media’s broadcast of the video along with intensive
print reporting in the aftermath of the crime fed much of Los Angeles’s
“[o]utrage and indignation” following an acquittal that directly
contradicted what viewers had witnessed.143 In this sense, the media’s
furtherance of certain memories of the King beating—for example,
that the crime was a heinous and criminal abuse of authority—seemed
to take on greater dominance in Los Angeles than the account by the
jury that acquitted the officers.
Accordingly, the nature of the media’s collective memory
contributions can diverge dramatically from those deriving from
criminal trials. In terms of discrete memory, media can freely pursue
stories that arrange photos and videos in ways that provoke heightened
emotional impact but do not care to avoid undue prejudice.144 The
media can highlight the impact on victims or dig into the perpetrator’s
background without providing limiting instructions.145 And the media
can compile eyewitness testimony that need not account for the
Confrontation Clause.146
But the media nearly overpowers the criminal trial in its capacity
to contextualize the crime within larger memory frameworks. For the

140. Jo Livingston, How Video Shaped Our Understanding of the L.A. Riots, NEW REPUBLIC
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/142341/video-shaped-understanding-la-riots
[https://perma.cc/GLN7-QZH3].
141. Powell v. Superior Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 785, 789–90 (1991).
142. Clay Risen, George Holliday, Who Taped Police Beating of Rodney King, Dies at 61, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/us/george-holliday-dead.html [https://
perma.cc/68Y9-6BH7].
143. Ronald N. Jacobs, Civil Society and Crisis: Culture, Discourse, and the Rodney King
Beating, 101 AM. J. SOCIO. 1238, 1263 n.20 (1996).
144. See BARASH, supra note 136, at 118 (explaining that information in mass media is
commonly juxtaposed in a haphazard fashion, where adjacent, unrelated, but significant pieces of
information create a heightened sense of immediacy).
145. See, e.g., Aaron Morrison, In His Final Days, Ahmaud Arbery’s Life Was at a Crossroads,
AP NEWS (Nov. 24, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/life-of-ahmaud-arbery-e869ad7dc4ae6b8
6635507d412e63319 [https://perma.cc/8CB3-FY73] (providing a profile of Arbery’s life prior to
being murdered by three men on February 23, 2020).
146. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause prohibits testimonial out-of-court statements by witnesses unless the witness is unavailable
or the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
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criminal trial to “render justice, and nothing else,”147 or even to come
close to that ideal, the trial cannot purposefully situate the defendant’s
offense within transcendent narratives about structural racism,
domestic abuse, or wealth inequality. The institution is simply not built
for pursuing this kind of memory work. By contrast, the media is
practically addicted to the task.
Consider Kyle Rittenhouse’s case, where Rittenhouse killed two
Black Lives Matter protestors and wounded a third.148 After the
shooting, and surrounding his trial, the media hosted wide-ranging
debates about what Kyle Rittenhouse’s case said about white
supremacy149 and the appropriateness of a strong self-defense when
accounting for the proliferation of guns.150 Whereas the trial could
not—and ought not—have been the place for these debates, the media
could ably forge collective memory of the offense, which includes both
discrete memory of the act and efforts to situate that memory within
larger memory frameworks.
2. Competing in the Courtroom: Mass Media at Trial. While mass
media plays a critical role in crafting narratives of the criminal offense
by disseminating footage of and commentary on the crime, media also
contributes to collective memory by covering and broadcasting the
trial. While the First Amendment protects journalists’ access to the
courtroom, television broadcasts of state trials are a relatively new
phenomenon and remain limited in federal courts.151 Judges can
maintain safeguards, like a camera “kill switch,” to limit the influence

147. ARENDT, supra note 16.
148. Michael Tarm, Scott Bauer & Amy Forliti, Jury Finds Rittenhouse Not Guilty in Kenosha
Shootings, AP NEWS (Nov. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/jury-finds-kyle-rittenhouse-notguilty-in-kenosha-shootings-27f812ba532d65c044617483c915e4de [https://perma.cc/8WKE-HBP5].
149. See, e.g., Jeneé Osterheldt, Kyle Rittenhouse, White Supremacy, and the Privilege of SelfDefense, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 19, 2021, 7:32 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/11/19/metro/
kyle-rittenhouse-white-supremacy-privilege-self-defense [https://perma.cc/84UZ-F7Q8] (“Had he
been white and protecting Black lives in Kenosha instead of purportedly protecting cars, he’d be
in prison. . . . Rittenhouse has the privilege of white power.”).
150. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Mitch Smith, When It Comes to Self-Defense, the Prosecution
Has a Heavier Burden, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2021, 7:58 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/
19/us/rittenhouse-acquittal-self-defense.html [https://perma.cc/3TLS-DKWF] (“If we’re going to
have a country in which guns are pervasive and the law has little or nothing to say about where
and when one may carry a gun and display a gun then we are going to have a situation where selfdefense law can’t really handle it.” (quoting Professor Samuel Buell)).
151. BARASH, supra note 136, at 164.
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of cameras.152 Nonetheless, cameras in the courtroom, when available,
provide the “voyeuristic” public with a narrow viewpoint into the
trial.153
Accounting for the media’s and the trial’s respective contributions
to this coverage may be a futile exercise, but this arena of competition
highlights that jockeying for memory dominance often includes
instances where sources of memory operate symbiotically. The
function of the media as a filter of the trial appears most potent when
a video of the crime is not available for the public. Unlike the trial for
the Rodney King beating that centered around a video of the offense,154
the O.J. Simpson trial had no video evidence of the crime itself. As a
result, the trial, disseminated through the media, became the primary
wellspring of information about the crime, and media coverage
produced drastically polarized narratives of the crime along racial lines
on the question of guilt or innocence. One poll prior to the verdict
indicated that 77 percent of white people believed Simpson was guilty,
while 72 percent of Black people believed Simpson was innocent.155
Following acquittal, for which a sizeable segment of the population was
incredulous, ABC News’ legal counsel described the fundamental
disconnect between the public and jury’s trial experience: “They’re not
in the courtroom; they don’t see what the jurors see. . . . [They] don’t
see the nonverbal behavior of witnesses in the same way as you see it
on a television camera. . . . [They] don’t see some of the
photographs.”156 Thus, the O.J. Simpson trial highlighted that even live
broadcast of a trial can craft narratives different from those created in
the courtroom.

152. See COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 109 (describing Judge Ito’s “kill switch” for the TV
cameras, which were used once when the camera showed a juror whose anonymity was to be
protected).
153. Gewirtz, supra note 72, at 884 (“[T]he new technology of cameras in the courtroom and
Court TV . . . have made the general public an immediate audience for many trials.”).
154. See Risen, supra note 142 (“Mr. Holliday’s video played a critical role in the assault trial
of four officers involved in the King beating.”).
155. Joe Chidley, The Simpson Jury Faces the Race Factor, MACLEAN’S (Oct. 9, 1995), https:/
/archive.macleans.ca/article/1995/10/9/the-simpson-jury-faces-the-race-factor [https://perma.cc/X
34D-4CYX].
156. BARASH, supra note 136, at 166 (quoting Peter Arnella).
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III. THE TRIAL OF DEREK CHAUVIN
On May 25, 2020, Derek Chauvin murdered George Floyd.157
Following a 911 call reporting that Floyd had attempted to purchase
cigarettes with a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill, police arrived on the
scene.158 Efforts to place Floyd in the police cruiser failed. Soon
thereafter, then-Officer Chauvin pinned Floyd to the ground by
placing his knee on Floyd’s neck for nine minutes and twenty-nine
seconds.159
On instinct, one bystander, Darnella Frazier, began recording the
scene on her cell phone camera.160 Frazier posted her video, which
captured Floyd’s pleas and eventual final breath, to her Facebook
account later that day.161 The video spread across continents in hours
and set off what is widely considered the largest protest movement in
the history of the United States.162
Accounting for the collective memory of George Floyd’s murder
within just a few years of its occurring may be a task fraught with
speculation. After all, a community’s understanding of a past event can
lay dormant or evolve slowly for decades.163 This Note proposes no
answer to how much time is required to reflect on an event to analyze
its collective memory. Instead, this Part recognizes the near certainty
that narratives surrounding George Floyd’s murder will evolve as time
progresses, and it consequently examines how the trial of Derek
Chauvin could contribute to that mnemonic evolution. Using the
framework developed in Part II, this Part examines the trial’s
constituent storytellers, the capacity of the unintentional seconddegree murder charge to capture the gravity of the George Floyd

157. See Verdict, Count I, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21,
2021) (stating that jury found Chauvin guilty as to “Count I: Unintentional second-degree murder
while committing a felony”).
158. Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Willis & Robin
Stein, How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/U9W3-HNRF].
159. Id.
160. Chao Xiong & Paul Walsh, ‘World Needed to See,’ Says Woman Who Took Video of Man
Dying Under Officer’s Knee, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (May 26, 2020, 11:44 PM), https://
www.startribune.com/world-needed-to-see-says-woman-who-took-video-of-man-dying-under-of
ficer-s-knee/570774152 [https://perma.cc/VC97-9PUJ].
161. Id.
162. Buchanan et al., supra note 21.
163. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 14, at 210 (describing the evolution of Watergate
memory as those personally involved in the scandal “pass from the scene”).
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murder, the role of the jury, and the media’s contributions as a
competitor to the trial.
A. Narrative Storytelling and Roles of Parties at Derek Chauvin’s
Trial
1. Prosecution Narrative and Filling in for George Floyd. In a
homicide case, the prosecutor’s limited capacity to bring in the victim’s
voice can constrain the prosecutor’s ability to craft a collective
memory.164 In the trial of Derek Chauvin, prosecutors, led by
Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, stood in for George
Floyd’s voice.165 Taking the case from a local prosecutor in whom Black
community leaders lacked trust,166 the attorney general’s prosecutors
arguably instilled legitimacy into its narratives of the offense. And
despite George Floyd’s silence in court, the prosecutors made ample
use of video testimony to bring in George Floyd’s voice.167
Several of the prosecution’s narrative themes helped craft certain
memories of the offense.168 First, the prosecutor called on the jurors to
“believe [their] eyes” when watching the video.169 The prosecution’s
straightforward reminder highlights an apparent risk that the jurors
might discount Chauvin’s undisguised act as worthy of criminal
sanction. Instead, the narrative boosts the video’s ability to further
memories centered around guilt by reminding the jury that the public
nature of Chauvin’s brutality ought not undermine the legitimacy of
the video itself.

164. See supra Part II.B.1.
165. Stephen Montemayor, Latest Chapter of Keith Ellison and Mike Freeman’s Partnership
Could Define Their Careers, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (June 17, 2020, 11:17 PM), https://
www.startribune.com/officer-prosecution-latest-test-for-keith-ellison-mike-freeman/571316632
[https://perma.cc/LW4D-6WQU].
166. Id. (“Ellison, who has a deep history in civil rights activism, enjoys a trust from
Minnesota’s black community that Freeman cannot claim.”).
167. See Cheryl Corley, How Using Videos at Chauvin Trial and Others Impacts Criminal
Justice, NPR (May 7, 2021, 10:28 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/07/994507257/how-usingvideos-at-chauvin-trial-and-others-impacts-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/79WF-3562] (“In the
Chauvin trial, video was the star.”).
168. The narratives presented in this Section come exclusively from the pre-verdict stage of
the trial, as significant victim impact testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial falls
outside the scope of this Note.
169. Transcript of Proc. at 2669, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar.
29, 2021) (Transcript Vol. 13) (“[Y]ou can believe your eyes that it’s a homicide, it’s murder, you
can believe your eyes.”).
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Second, Prosecutor Jerry Blackwell famously rebutted the
defense’s counternarrative on alternative causes of death by saying,
“You were told . . . that Mr. Floyd died because his heart was too
big . . . . The truth of the matter is that the reason George Floyd is dead
is because Mr. Chauvin’s heart was too small.”170 Employing expert
testimony, the prosecution proved this artful point with cold, scientific
precision. Pulmonologist Dr. Martin Tobin, who highlighted that
George Floyd exhibited a normal respiratory rate prior to
asphyxiation, compared normal respiratory rates against someone with
heart disease to explain that George Floyd’s heart condition did not
cause him to experience a low level of oxygen independent of Derek
Chauvin’s choke hold.171 Additionally, Dr. Tobin used this data point,
as well as George Floyd’s carbon dioxide level, to dispel the notion that
residual fentanyl detected in his system contributed to his low level of
oxygen—thus isolating Derek Chauvin’s small heart as the cause of
death.172 Because cause of death was one of the primary issues at trial
and in the public eye,173 the prosecution’s use of expert testimony to
scientifically establish Derek Chauvin as the cause of death contributes
to narratives of the offense that center on Chauvin’s guilt.
Lastly, the prosecution sequestered Derek Chauvin from his role
as a police officer and explicitly disentangled the case from systemic
police misconduct. Among an array of expert witnesses on reasonable
force, Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo explained that
Derek Chauvin’s conduct violated the department’s definition of neck
restraint, defensive tactics, and reasonable force, and the department’s
policy on rendering aid.174 In closing arguments, Prosecutor Steve
Schleicher furthered, “The defendant is on trial not for being a police
officer, it’s not the State versus the police. He’s not on trial for who he

170. Transcript of Proc. at 5910, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr.
19, 2021) (Transcript Vol. 27) [hereinafter Transcript Vol. 27].
171. Shaila Dewan, Expert Witness Pinpoints Floyd’s Final Breath and Dismisses Talk of
Overdose, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/us/george-floydbreath-oxygen.html [https://perma.cc/MTV2-2TEK].
172. Id.
173. Lenny Bernstein & Holly Bailey, At the Heart of Derek Chauvin’s Trial Is This Question:
What Killed George Floyd?, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2021, 7:58 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/health/george-floyd-fentanyl/2021/03/10/c3d4f328-76ec-11eb-9537-496158cc5fd9_stor
y.html [https://perma.cc/2RRT-N5ME].
174. Erin Ailworth & Joe Barrett, Derek Chauvin Violated Department Policies, Minneapolis
Police Chief Says, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2021, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/george-floydemergency-room-doctor-said-lack-of-oxygen-was-most-likely-cause-of-death-11617640266 [https
://perma.cc/WV46-4SPK].
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was, he’s on trial for what he did.”175 This narrative is logical in the
context of the trial: the prosecution’s divorcing Derek Chauvin from
his occupation helped undermine the notion that Chauvin’s conduct
was objectively reasonable. But this prosecution narrative may
undermine the effective contextualization of the offense that fits
Floyd’s murder within larger memory structures of systemic police
misconduct, highlighting how even the prosecution could
counterintuitively produce memory at odds with that generally
pursued by activists of criminal justice reform.
2. Derek Chauvin’s Counternarratives.
The defense’s
counternarratives raised at trial, while ultimately unavailing, still carry
memory-producing power beyond their legal use in court. First, the
defense argued that Chauvin had used objectively reasonable force.176
The argument, while seeking to satisfy a legal definition set in Graham
v. Connor,177 serves two mnemonic functions as well. One, by
contextualizing Chauvin’s behavior within professional conduct, the
defense sought to refurbish Chauvin’s status as a police officer. And
two, by presenting a longer timeframe of the struggle to arrest George
Floyd, the defense displayed a more complex picture leading to the
fateful choke hold, even if utterly unworthy of excusing Chauvin’s
conduct.
Second, the defense countered the prosecution’s theory of cause
of death by positing that George Floyd’s drug use and heart condition
caused the death.178 The defense, by introducing a video of a prior
arrest where Floyd exhibited similar behavior, attempted to establish
that the struggle to overcome Floyd’s claustrophobia and place him in
the police cruiser was the product of drugs.179 This argument, while
legally significant, also allowed the defense to dig into George Floyd’s

175. Transcript Vol. 27, supra note 170, at 5722.
176. Michael Tarm, Explainer: How Is ‘Reasonableness’ Key to Chauvin’s Defense?, AP NEWS
(Apr. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/us-news-trials-death-of-george-floyd-racial-injusticeus-supreme-court-8ee9b9b218e92faa434d241ef55f5488 [https://perma.cc/X5BT-CSGN].
177. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
178. See Kathleen Foody, Explainer: State, Defense Differ on Impact of Floyd Drug Use, AP
NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/trials-us-news-death-of-george-floyd-racialinjustice-a7c9b49984016908d0bdbb385db66ec1 [https://perma.cc/CW23-K9CK] (“Defense attorney
Eric Nelson incorporated drug use into his central argument.”).
179. See Shaila Dewan, Defense Focuses on George Floyd’s Prior Arrest and Drug Use, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2021) [hereinafter Dewan, Defense Focuses on George Floyd’s Prior Arrest and
Drug Use], https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/us/george-floyds-prior-arrest-drug-use.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/7LUS-75PX].
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life in front of the jury and the public. For certain dominant memories
of the crime, inserting what amounts to potentially damaging victim
character evidence could undermine an essentialist good versus evil
dynamic. For others still, the prior arrests and drug use could help to
fortify efforts to contextualize the crime within cumulative memory
frameworks that feature systemic failures of the criminal justice
system.
Altogether, the mere presence of the defendant’s
counternarratives promotes the legitimacy of the trial in the public eye
in a way that many may take for granted. One could argue that slipping
these arguments into the public sphere undermines monolithic
Durkheimian narratives of the crime.180 But that is not—and ought not
be—the point of criminal trials. Instead, the very presence of
counternarratives in the Derek Chauvin trial helps to accomplish what
Osiel labels discursive solidarity, or “a recognition that a society’s
members often disagree radically regarding their conceptions of
justice and . . . nevertheless . . . settle upon a common scheme of
association and cooperation.”181 And furthermore, the opportunity to
present a full defense legitimizes the process and boosts the trial’s
capacity to contribute to public narratives of the offense.
3. Judge Cahill as Evidentiary Arbiter. The trial judge’s domain
over evidentiary rulings distorts the history of the crime by limiting the
trial to legally relevant facts for legally permissible purposes.182 Taking
on an enabling function for the parties’ respective storytelling, Judge
Peter A. Cahill highlighted the role dependency of a judge’s memory
making, even for notable evidentiary rulings. For example, Judge
Cahill admitted testimony under Minnesota’s “spark of life” doctrine
to allow the state to call witnesses to speak to George Floyd’s life.183
George Floyd’s brother, Philonise Floyd, and girlfriend, Courteney
Ross, testified to Floyd’s standing in the community and his struggles
with addiction to help paint a fuller picture of Floyd’s life.184

180. See OSIEL, supra note 5, at 33 (explaining that Durkheim’s approach “leaves no room”
for alternative narratives).
181. Id. at 51.
182. See supra Part II.B.3.
183. Jonathan Allen & Joseph Ax, ‘Spark of Life’: Jury To Hear from George Floyd’s Brother
in Quirk of Minnesota Law, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usarace-georgefloyd-spark/spark-of-life-jury-to-hear-from-george-floyds-brother-in-quirk-ofminnesota-law-idUSKBN2BV23Z [https://perma.cc/VP25-ZT6J].
184. Id.
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Additionally, Judge Cahill admitted bodycam video of George
Floyd’s prior arrest that occurred one year before the murder.185 At the
earlier traffic stop, George Floyd ingested Percocet and required
emergency medical attention.186 Judge Cahill had initially excluded the
arrest before reversing his own ruling upon the subsequent discovery
of methamphetamine in the police cruiser in which George Floyd was
briefly forced.187 This significant ruling, representing one of the closer
calls, ultimately enabled the defense’s theory of drugs as the cause of
death.188 Regardless of public misgivings about the spark of life
doctrine and fair critiques of admitting Floyd’s prior arrest, Judge
Cahill had a role in lawfully guarding the factual record upon which the
parties crafted their narratives. Such an impact exemplifies the judge’s
enabling function for memory making.
B. Capacity of Unintentional Murder to Capture the Gravity of the
Offense
Criminal statutes provide the boundaries of the advocates’
narratives at trial.189 While the prosecutor’s power to select the charges
creates an asymmetry between the parties, both must proceed to prove
or undermine how the evidence fits into the offense’s rigid elements.190
The prosecution charged Derek Chauvin with second-degree
unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree
manslaughter.191 The second-degree unintentional murder charge, the
highest offense, is a felony-murder charge.192 Conviction requires
committing or attempting to commit felony third-degree assault while
unintentionally causing the death of another.193 Third-degree assault
requires the defendant intentionally inflict substantial bodily harm.194
185. Dewan, Defense Focuses on George Floyd’s Prior Arrest and Drug Use, supra note 179.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. (“Derek Chauvin’s defense hinges on an argument that George Floyd’s drug use,
not Mr. Chauvin’s knee, caused his death.”).
189. See supra Part II.C.
190. Id.
191. Amended Complaint at 1–2, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June
3, 2020).
192. Greg Egan, George Floyd’s Legacy: Reforming, Relating, and Rethinking Through
Chauvin’s Conviction and Appeal Under a Felony-Murder Doctrine Long-Weaponized Against
People of Color, 39 LAW & INEQ. 543, 543 (2021).
193. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2) (2020).
194. MINN. STAT. § 609.223 (2020). The third-degree murder charge requires causing the
death of another by “perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved
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None of the charges against Chauvin required that the prosecution
prove he intended to cause Floyd’s death directly. The highest charge
brought against him, felony murder, only requires proving the intent of
the underlying felony—in this case, third-degree assault.195 In other
words, the jury only had to find Chauvin intended the assault, not the
homicide. Setting the narrative boundary here—where Chauvin’s
mental state is attributable to the death only indirectly—poses a
challenge to the mnemonic power of the charge to capture the gravity
of the offense. Imposing the specific intent of the felony assault onto
the death seems in some ways to cheapen a homicide that set off an
“awakening” on systemic racism and police brutality in America.196 For
a crime that so profoundly shifted the conversation on race and stirred
millions to the streets, one could argue that the indictment’s inability
to directly capture a mens rea ordinarily reserved for more abhorrent
crimes undermines the mnemonic power of the trial.
On the other hand, focusing on the minutiae of the offenses—
something legal professionals are admittedly trained to do—could fail
to capture how the public consumed information about the offenses.
While polling on the public’s comprehension of the various offenses for
which Chauvin was convicted is lacking,197 speeches, statements, and
media coverage of the verdict indicate that the public was largely told
a story of the crime focused on one offense: murder, plain and simple.198
This begs the question whether the specificity of the offense as first-,
second-, or third- degree murder is of great importance with respect to
mind, without regard for human life.” MINN. STAT. § 609.195(a) (2020). The second-degree
manslaughter charge requires causing the death of another by “culpable negligence whereby the
person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great
bodily harm.” MINN. STAT. § 609.205(1) (2020). This Note avoids redundancy by focusing on the
highest charge only. The intent analysis that follows could apply to the two lower charges.
195. See MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2) (2020) (stating the crime requires “caus[ing] the death of a
human being without intent to effect the death of any person, while intentionally inflicting or
attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim”).
196. Justin Worland, America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME (June
11, 2020, 6:41 AM), https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america [https://perma.cc/F87BG66P] (“[T]he debate over systemic racism has spread across the nation and around the world.”).
197. See, e.g., Eli Yokley, Most Americans Approve of Derek Chauvin’s Conviction, but Fewer
See Justice for George Floyd, MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 22, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://morning
consult.com/2021/04/22/chauvin-conviction-floyd-response-polling [https://perma.cc/G6RP-YT
LG] (providing polling on views on the trial but not on comprehension of the charges).
198. See, e.g., President Joseph R. Biden, Remarks by President Biden on the Verdict in the
Derek Chauvin Trial for the Death of George Floyd (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/20/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-verdict-in-thederek-chauvin-trial-for-the-death-of-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/3N5K-GTYF] (calling the
crime “murder” with no qualification on five occasions).
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its contributions to collective memory. But for George Floyd’s brother,
Philonise, the fact that Chauvin was convicted of unintentional murder
did not appear to undermine its historical significance: “In contrast to
the jury that 66 years ago refused to convict the men who brutalized,
maimed and killed Emmett Till, this jury took a decisive stand for
justice. As much as this verdict is a vindication for George, it is for
Emmett, too.”199
C. Chauvin Trial Jury Composition and Deliberation
The composition and deliberation of the jury can directly impact
the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the verdict.200 The jury
composition and deliberation in the Derek Chauvin trial bolstered the
legitimacy of its “authoritative” account of the crime.201
The twelve-person jury in the Derek Chauvin trial was drawn from
a jury pool in Hennepin County, where the murder occurred.202 Ahead
of trial, Chauvin moved for a change of venue, arguing that “[t]he
‘barrage’ of prejudicial publicity surrounding this case ha[d] created ‘so
huge a public passion’ that a fair trial [would be] impossible . . . .”203 In
denying this motion, Judge Cahill argued, “I don’t think there’s any
place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme
amounts of publicity on this case.”204 To further protect against bias,
the court distributed a questionnaire in the mail that asked ten
questions to gauge potential jurors’ familiarity with the case, views on
the defendant, and desire to serve on the jury.205
The resulting twelve-person jury had seven women and five men,
and four Black people, six white people, and two who identified as

199. Philonise Floyd, Opinion, For My Brother George Floyd, This Is What Justice Feels Like,
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2021, 11:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/21/
philonise-floyd-chauvin-verdict-justice [https://perma.cc/7FZX-V3CX].
200. See supra Part II.D.
201. See COTTERILL, supra note 66, at 59 (arguing that the jury “reaches the final decision
about the coherence of the authoritative version of the crime’s narrative”).
202. Tim Arango, Twelve Jurors Seated in Chauvin Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/us/chauvin-jury-selection-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/H8
D9-F3WR].
203. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of New Trial and Change of Venue at 2,
State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 18, 2021).
204. Transcript of Proc. at 2122, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar.
19, 2021) (Transcript Vol. 10).
205. Special Juror Questionnaire, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec.
22, 2020).
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multiracial.206 The decision to maintain the venue in Minnesota’s most
diverse city, despite the high level of publicity, helped the jury avoid
the legitimacy concerns that plagued the jury in the Rodney King trial.
Legal experts “expressed concern about . . . an all-white—or nearly allwhite—jury,” arguing “that diversity was necessary for the trial to be
accepted within the Black community as legitimate.”207 In fact, the jury
represented an even higher percentage of Black people than
Minneapolis itself.208 Despite Chauvin’s concerns about a tainted jury
pool, the added efforts to control for bias and achieve diversity in the
panel likely helped legitimize the jury’s voice in the public’s collective
memory of the murder.
The Chauvin jurors deliberated for five hours over two days.209 At
least one juror has spoken about the deliberation experience to the
press.210 In the sequestered room, the jurors voted on each offense,
starting with the second-degree manslaughter charge and working up
to the second-degree unintentional murder charge.211 Following an
initial 11–1 vote on the manslaughter charge, a discussion eventually
convinced the one holdout.212 The next day, the jurors resumed
deliberations on third-degree murder, where the same holdout needed
three-and-a-half hours of detailed discussion to eventually vote to
convict.213 The most severe offense, second-degree unintentional
murder, took just twenty-to-thirty minutes for a unanimous vote to
convict.214
While scholar Janet Cotterill argues that the jury’s verdict reflects
the “authoritative” account of the criminal offense, this Note poses
several alternative sources of authority and reasons as to why the jury’s
authority might be questioned. Measuring the impact of the Derek
Chauvin jury on the collective memory of the offense may be
particularly challenging because of widely shared public beliefs on the

206. Arango, supra note 202.
207. Id.
208. Liane Jackson, Lessons from the Chauvin Conviction: Justice Requires Diverse Juries, 107
A.B.A. J. 9, 9 (2021).
209. Joe Barrett & Deena Winter, Derek Chauvin Juror: ‘We All Agreed at Some Point That
It Was Too Much,’ WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2021, 11:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-jurorin-derek-chauvin-trial-lifts-the-curtain-on-deliberations-11619705799 [https://perma.cc/552S-QKMN].
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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defendant’s guilt. Polls around the time show that 75 percent of
Americans believed Chauvin was guilty—with 70 percent of white
Americans and 93 percent of Black Americans holding this view.215
While those polled likely heard only portions of the testimony and
faced none of the profound responsibility of imposing criminal
sanctions,216 overwhelming support for the jury’s verdict suggests the
jury, at a minimum, had a buttressing effect for dominant collective
memory of the crime focused on guilt or innocence. As the following
Section highlights, however, the binary simplicity of the verdict makes
for an incomplete account of the crime.
D. Media’s Contributions as a Competitor to the Derek Chauvin Trial
Collective memories and their sources can jockey for dominance,
and the two primary sources of memory for criminal acts are the trial
and the media.217 While the trial of Derek Chauvin serves as a site of
memory for George Floyd’s murder, the media played a critical role in
establishing societal narratives of the offense.218
The trial of Derek Chauvin is unique because “George Floyd died
in all of our living rooms.”219 Darnella Frazier’s instinctual decision to
film the abuse of authority unfolding before her allowed “millions of
people [to] watch the last 9 minutes and 29 seconds of Floyd’s life.”220
Through the video’s publication on TV and social media, the public
gained widespread and relatively unfiltered access to the crime—
sparking an unprecedented protest movement.221
The media had a built-in advantage in establishing collective
memory of George Floyd’s murder. While memory can evolve over
215. Jennifer de Pinto, CBS News Poll: Widespread Agreement with Chauvin Verdict, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 25, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/Chauvin-verdict-opinion-poll
[https://perma.cc/AHD2-CXQX].
216. See Barrett & Winter, supra note 209 (“‘I almost broke down from that,’ . . . . ‘We
decided his life. That’s tough. That’s tough to deal with. Even though it’s the right decision, it’s
still tough.’” (quoting Chauvin juror Brandon Mitchell)).
217. See supra Part I.B; supra Part II.E.1.
218. While this Note focuses on media as the primary competing source of memory, physical
memorials around the United States also play a critical role. For an overview of the memorials to
George Floyd (and their demise) two years from the date of the murder, see Charles M. Blow,
Opinion, The Great Erasure, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2022/05/20/opinion/blm-george-floyd-mural.html [https://perma.cc/KGN9-N6FW].
219. Skylar Hughes, A Look Inside the Most Dynamic Criminal Trial of 2021, DUKE RSCH.
BLOG (Sept. 22, 2021), https://researchblog.duke.edu/2021/09/22/even-with-video-evidence-itwas-a-fraught-case [https://perma.cc/CHS3-QQ2Z] (quoting Prosecutor Jerry Blackwell).
220. Oritseweyinmi Joe, supra note 20, at 140.
221. Buchanan et al., supra note 21.
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time, the media had the opportunity to set the foundation for collective
memory of the offense by being first to the game relative to the trial.
For example, major news outlets transformed disparate video sources
and eyewitness accounts into comprehensive explanations of what
occurred in front of Cup Foods on May 25, 2020.222 As the author of
the “first rough draft of history,”223 the media had the opportunity to
begin to sediment narratives of the murder in the minds of the public
well before the trial even began.
Further, the media holds a superior mnemonic authority by virtue
of its ability to contextualize George Floyd’s murder as part of larger
memory structures—particularly memories of police misconduct
against Black Americans. While the Chauvin prosecutors explicitly
isolated Chauvin from his profession,224 the media faced neither the
prosecutor’s task of convincing potentially police-sympathetic jurors
nor the principle of personal liability.225 For example, journalists across
outlets featured stories on the history of police violence in
Minneapolis, the Black Lives Matter movement, and society-wide
shifts on views of systemic racism.226 More specifically, the media,
unlike the trial, could forge together the memory of Breonna Taylor’s
death at the hands of police two months prior, which broadened
discussions about police misconduct to include more intersectional
dialogue on race and gender.227
Accounting for each source’s contributions in TV broadcast and
coverage of the trial is likely a futile exercise. The symbiotic
222. See Hill et al., supra note 158 (providing a ten-minute analysis of how George Floyd
died).
223. EDWIN AMENTA & NEAL CAREN, ROUGH DRAFT OF HISTORY: A CENTURY OF US
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE NEWS 1 (2022) (“Journalists like to say that newspapers provide the
first rough draft of history.”).
224. See supra Part III.A.1.
225. See HALLEVY, supra note 111 (“The essence of the principle of personal liability is the
imposition of criminal liability and punishment on individuals who have chosen to commit an
offense by exercising their own choice.”).
226. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Why Minneapolis Was the Breaking Point, ATLANTIC (June 12,
2020, 4:45 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/wesley-lowery-georgefloyd-minneapolis-black-lives/612391 [https://perma.cc/6VAR-4HBA] (contextualizing Floyd’s
murder within Minneapolis’ history of police misconduct); Buchanan et al., supra note 21
(analyzing the Black Lives Matter movement); Worland, supra note 196 (describing the United
States’ racial “awakening” following George Floyd’s murder).
227. Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Why Aren’t We All Talking About Breonna Taylor?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/breonna-taylor-black-livesmatter-women.html [https://perma.cc/G94P-6DYE] (“Black women’s experiences of police
brutality and their tireless contributions to mass social justice movements have almost always
been left out of the picture . . . .”).
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relationship between the two almost certainly contributed to collective
memory of the crime. Several broadcasts serviced continuous coverage
of the trial,228 with viewership peaking on the day of the verdict when
at least 23.2 million viewers tuned in in the United States.229 The media
played a considerable role by providing commentary and filtering
significant segments of the trial for more convenient consumption. For
instance, several outlets provided daily trial highlight reels and analysis
of the parties’ arguments.230
But most distinctively, the media’s contextualization of the verdict
helps to situate the crime within larger memory frameworks of racism.
The verdict alone has considerable memory power. But the verdict
sparked vigorous debate about what the case means for racial justice.
For some, the verdict vindicated a narrative of racial improvement,
especially when compared to the perceived failure of the trial for the
officers who beat Rodney King thirty years prior.231 For others still, the
offense itself showcases racial injustice that no verdict could upend.232
It is likely too early to determine the “dominant” source of
memory for George Floyd’s murder, but each source’s structural
advantages in memory production point to a robust competition. While
the media facilitated the American public’s consumption of the crime
video and creation of broader contextual narratives, there remains a
role for the trial, particularly through the disciplinary production of
storytelling.
228. Eric Deggans, With Audience in Mind, Media Offers Varied Treatment of Chauvin Trial,
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 10, 2021, 5:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/
986125475/with-audience-in-mind-media-offers-varied-treatment-of-chauvin-trial [https://perm
a.cc/C2XJ-4TRL] (“[W]e’ve seen some cable TV news channels go into continuous coverage
mode as the trial is going on . . . .”).
229. Nielsen: At Least 23.2 Million Watched Chauvin Verdict, AP NEWS (Apr. 22, 2021), https:/
/apnews.com/article/george-floyd-death-of-george-floyd-arts-and-entertainment-90295405db812
108acd9c45433b2a879 [https://perma.cc/KE6H-SXJU].
230. See, e.g., Joe Barrett & Erin Ailworth, Trial of Derek Chauvin in George Floyd’s Death
Opens With Clash Over Evidence, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2021, 6:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/derek-chauvin-betrayed-this-badge-in-subduing-george-floyd-prosecutors-say-11617031
299 [https://perma.cc/JMQ7-LPKG] (providing highlight clip and analysis of Chauvin trial); Apr.
19 Highlights for the Murder Trial of Derek Chauvin, NBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021, 10:17 PM), https:/
/www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/live-blog/derek-chauvin-trial-2021-04-19-n1264442 [https://per
ma.cc/RZ7N-JEC6] (providing a highlight clip and commentary on the Chauvin trial).
231. See Erin Aubry Kaplan, Have We Really Come That Far Since Rodney King?, POLITICO
(Apr. 24, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/04/24/have-we-reallycome-that-far-since-rodney-king-484494 [https://perma.cc/2BJS-7NW6] (describing the Chauvin
verdict as progress since the King case).
232. See Hughes, supra note 219 (“Don’t call it justice, because if it were, George Floyd would
still be alive.” (quoting Prosecutor Jerry Blackwell)).
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CONCLUSION
On May 25, 2020, a few “members of the community, all
converged by fate by one single moment in time . . . to witness 9
minutes and 29 seconds of shocking abuse of authority, to watch a man
die.”233 Beyond those witnesses, the country collectively remembers
George Floyd’s murder through Darnella Frazier’s video, through its
subsequent dissemination in the media, and, as this Note argues,
through the trial of Derek Chauvin.
Collective memory shapes attitudes about the past to inform
values and actions in the present. While political trials appear better
equipped to craft collective memory, U.S. criminal trials have the tools
to instill historical meaning in prominent criminal acts. The evolution
of the memory of George Floyd’s murder will continue to shape calls
for racial justice and police reform. The Derek Chauvin trial
contributes to that memory through storytelling, the capacity of the
charges to capture the gravity of the murder, and the jury’s ultimate
verdict. What the murder means within larger memory frameworks will
shift in the coming years. For some, the crime could signal a tipping
point for police misconduct.234 For others, it remains a call to action:
“[T]here’s so much more work to be done . . . . What happens when
there’s no camera, right?”235

233. Transcript Vol. 27, supra note 170, at 5776.
234. See generally Tamara F. Lawson, Awakening the American Jury: Did the Killing of
George Floyd Alter Juror Deliberations Forever?, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 847, 848 (2021) (considering
“whether the collective trauma of witnessing police violence in 2020 . . . has any translative impact
upon the American jury and its future deliberations”).
235. Emma Bowman, ‘Finally’: America Reacts to Chauvin Guilty Verdict, NPR (Apr. 20,
2021, 11:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/04/20/
989335036/finally-america-reacts-to-chauvin-guilty-verdict [https://perma.cc/QT72-URGF].

